The International Effects of Climate Change on Agricultural Commodity Prices, and the Wider Effects on New Zealand by Adolf Stroombergen
* Adolf Stroombergen is an Affiliate of Motu, and is Chief Economist and Director of 
Infometrics Limited. 
 The International Effects of Climate Change on 
Agricultural Commodity Prices, and the Wider 
Effects on New Zealand 
Adolf Stroombergen* 
Motu Working Paper 10-14 














This report has been prepared by Dr Adolf Stroombergen. Comments on a first draft by 
Dr Suzi Kerr and Niven Winchester are gratefully acknowledged. Funding for this report 
was from the Foundation for Research Science and Technology through the Integrated 
Economics of Climate Change programme, led by Motu. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy Research 
PO Box 24390 
Wellington 
New Zealand 
Email    info@motu.org.nz 
Telephone  +64 4 9394250 
Website  www.motu.org.nz 
© 2010 Motu Economic and Public Policy Research Trust and the authors. Short 
extracts, not exceeding two paragraphs, may be quoted provided clear attribution is 
given.  Motu Working Papers are research materials circulated by their authors for 
purposes of information and discussion. They have not necessarily undergone formal 
peer review or editorial treatment. ISSN 1176-2667 (Print), ISSN 1177-9047 (Online). 
   ii 
 
Abstract 
This research takes a closer look at the effects of climate change on New Zealand agriculture and 
on the wider economy, including indirect international effects such as changes in the prices of 
goods exported from and imported to New Zealand, as well as carbon prices and policies.  
Economic loss from short term catastrophic events such floods and landslides is not 
investigated.  Infometrics (2007) presented an initial quantitative analysis of some of the above 
issues.  In this paper they update the part of that report that looked at  the effect of climate 
change on agricultural commodity prices, by considering some new scenarios based on 
international research since 2007, and expand the time-period from 2025 to 2070. 
JEL codes 
F18, Q1, Q54 
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1. Introduction 
Research by EcoClimate (2007) looked at the direct effects of climate change on 
New Zealand agriculture and on the wider economy.  It summarised the findings of other 
researchers, coming to the provisional conclusion that a change of one standard deviation 
in the number of days of soil moisture deficit (DSMD, a measure of climate change 
effects on agriculture), reduces agricultural gross output by less than 5% in most cases.  
The flow-on effect on New Zealand’s GDP of such a change is around 0.1%.  However, 
the effects are not linear.  A change of three standard deviations in DSMD reduces 
national GDP by around 1%.   
These estimates do not include economic loss from short term catastrophic events 
such floods and landslides. 
Another, possibly more important dimension of the impact of climate change on 
New Zealand agriculture is via indirect international effects.  In broad terms this has two 
components: 
1.  How the impacts of climate change on other countries, and other 
countries’ reactions to those impacts (such as via trading arrangements and 
production subsidies), affect the prices of the sorts of goods New Zealand 
exports and imports.   
2.  How other countries deal with the task of reducing emissions, such 
as via carbon prices and protective policies against ‘free-riders’.  
Infometrics (2007) presented an initial quantitative analysis of some of the above 
issues.  Here we update the part of that report that looked at  the effect of climate change 
on agricultural commodity prices, by considering some new scenarios based on 
international research since 2007.  We also extend the focus of the analysis from 2025 to 
2070, a more sensible time horizon for looking at the effects of global warming, and take 
advantage of the new version of the ‘Energy Substitution Social Accounting Matrix’ 
(ESSAM) model, which is based on an estimated input-output table for 2005/06.
1
The results generally show that New Zealand benefits from the sorts of changes 
in agricultural commodity prices that are expected to occur under global warming, 
especially if there is no carbon fertilization effect. This is perhaps counter-intuitive. It 
  
                                                 
1 See Stroombergen (2008).     2 
arises because other countries also benefit from carbon fertilization, eroding the higher 
international prices that would occur without carbon fertilization – from which New 
Zealand would benefit substantially. 
Floods and other extreme events aside, it seems that the effects on New Zealand 
from changes in agricultural commodity prices caused by global warming could easily 
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2. Previous Research 
Infometrics (2007) looked at the economic effects on New Zealand in 2025 of 
changes in world agricultural commodity prices that could accompany climate change.  
Estimates of the effects of climate change on  agricultural prices came from international 
studies.  At the time such studies were scarce, and the situation has not changed much. 
The dearth is not in terms of the effects of climate change on agricultural 
production, although there is still much uncertainty in this regard, as will be discussed 
below.  The scarcity of research is in the link between changes in production and changes 
in prices, especially in relation to commodities that are important to new Zealand such as 
dairy and meat.  A change in the climate may shift agricultural supply curves, but the new 
price-quantity equilibria will include price changes as well as quantity changes.  Estimating 
these links requires the use of models that incorporate both demand curves and supply 
curves, and allow for international trade.  
Earlier studies such as Fischer et al (2005) and Parry et al (2004) used an integrated 
ecological-economic modelling framework to assess food production and security under 
climate change.  Cereal production is taken as a proxy for agricultural production as wheat, 
rice, maize and soybeans, account for two thirds of average calorific intake and provide 
most human protein either directly or indirectly via livestock feed. 
In contrast to Parry et al, Darwin (2004) distinguishes between crop and livestock 
production and prices.  Some livestock uses feed crops such as corn, so suggesting a 
positive relationship between crops and livestock production.  However, crops and 
livestock could also be substitutes with regard to land use. 
The analyses by Fischer et al proposes that climate change will increase the prices 
of agricultural commodities on world markets, but probably by less than 10%, allowing 
for CO2 fertilisation.  Darwin’s analysis also projects higher prices if CO2 fertilisation is 
excluded, but including it leads to a fall in prices.  Darwin’s methodology is somewhat 
more appealing as it allows for land use change and provides confidence intervals.  
Nevertheless all authors urge caution as there is substantial uncertainty around CO2 
fertilisation such that it is difficult to be confident about even the direction of price 
changes under climate change, let alone their magnitude.   
Accordingly Infometrics (2007) looked at two scenarios: 
     4 
•  Scenario 1: A 10% increase in world agricultural prices relative to a 
no climate change scenario, reflecting a drier and hotter climate.   
•  Scenario 2: A 10% fall in world agricultural prices due to better 
growing conditions throughout the world, which leads to a fall in demand for but 
New Zealand’s agricultural exports.  However, in recognition that this would likely 
be driven by CO2 fertilisation, agricultural productivity in New Zealand is raised by 
2% in crop production and 1% in livestock production. (This is all broadly 
consistent with Darwin’s estimates).  
The main results are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Effects of Climate Change in 2025 
(% change on BAU without climate change) 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
RGNDI  1.9  -2.7 
CO2e emissions  1.9  -3.5 
 
The increase in RGNDI
2
Scenario 2 presents the opposite picture, further exacerbated by the decline in 
demand for New Zealand products.  The international effects (lower prices and lower 
demand) easily outweigh the local productivity effect of CO2 fertilisation.   
 in Scenario 1 is caused by the lift in the terms of trade 
delivered by higher agricultural prices.  However, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
notably emissions of methane and nitrous oxide rise above BAU.  To the extent that New 
Zealand is part of an international agreement to reduce global emissions, this increase in 
emissions might affect how many emission units New Zealand would have to purchase on 
the world market.  This was not explored. 
In the following section some new international research is considered, which is 





                                                 
2 RGNDI is Real Gross National Disposable Income.  It is a better measure of economic welfare than GDP as it 
allows for net factor payments to foreigners and for changes in the terms of trade.     5 
 
3. New Estimates of Changes in World Prices 
As was the case previously, mention of dairy, meat and wool in studies of the 
effects of climate change on agriculture is extremely rare.  Thus we are forced into 
inferring what we can from studies that focus on changes in the prices of grains – 
following Fischer et al. 
 
Msangi and Rosegrant (2007) look at the effects of climate change on agriculture 
by linking the IMPACT-WATER model to models of stream flow and run-off that can 
downscale GCM results to 69 river basin areas.
Msangi and Rosegrant  
3
The modelling produces the price projections shown in Table 2. 
  The IMPACT model does include meats 
and milk, but unfortunately these commodities are not included in the WATER module.  
The analysis concentrates on rice, wheat and maize which, following Fischer at al, we can 
assume is a general proxy for human calorific intake.   
  
Table 2: Projections to 2000-2025 relative to BAU (%) 
  Price Changes  Quantity Changes 
  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Average  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Total 
2020:A1  -17  -13  -44  -27  2.0  -1.4  14.1  5.6 
2080:A1  -17  -14  -50  -23  2.0  -2.9  16.7  6.1 
2020:B2  -15  -12  -36  -30  2.0  0.0  11.9  5.2 
2080:B2  -17  -13  -40  -26  3.1  0.7  13.5  6.4 
 
The labels A1 and B2 refer to scenarios produced in the Special Report on Emission 
Scenarios (SRES) report by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Briefly: 
 
Scenario A1:  Rapid economic growth, low population growth, rapid 
introduction of new and more efficient technology.  Economic and cultural 
convergence and capacity building, with a substantial reduction in regional 
differences in per capita income.  The pursuit of personal wealth dominates the 
                                                 
3 GCM denotes Global Climate Models or General Circulation Models.     6 
pursuit of environmental quality. Global temperature change by 2010 is estimated 
at 2.8-3.8°C above 1990 (from the Hadley and Max Planck models). 
 
Scenario B2: Less world integration with local solutions to economic, 
social, and environmental sustainability.  Less rapid, and more diverse 
technological change, with emphasis on community initiatives and social 
innovation.  Global temperature change by 2100 estimated at 2.5-3.5°C above 1990 
(from the Hadley and Max Planck models). 
 
All results are expressed relative to a Business as Usual (BAU) scenario without 
climate change.  Note also that the 2020 scenarios from the GCMs relate to the 30 year 
period centred on the 2020s.  Similarly for the 2080 scenarios; their application to the 
2000-2025 period is (presumably) to provide sensitivity testing.   
Msangi and Rosegrant also look at production and price variability, not just 
averages, by changing the frequency of ENSO events.
4
Halving the number of ENSO events in tandem with the A1 and B2 scenarios 
reduces world food commodity prices by 2-3%, while doubling the number of events 
raises them by around 15%.  However, the effects of more ENSO are nonlinear.  Against 
the background of the current climate the change in prices for halved ENSO is still -2%, 
but for the doubled ENSO it is about 23%.  Thus the CO2 fertilization effect reduces the 
severity of an increase in the number of future ENSO events.  
  For the same mean change in 
water availability the models project lower total food production as a lack of water from 
more droughts reduces production, but more water from flooding cannot be utilised to lift 
production. 
The modelling results also show that rain fed agriculture is more affected by 
climate change than irrigated agriculture, due to the absence of means to supplement 
water deficits with more irrigation in many countries.  However, from an economics 
perspective this could be simplistic as irrigation is unlikely to have a vertical supply curve.  
Perhaps a better way to interpret the results is as indicating that adaptive measures such as 
irrigation and the development of more drought resistant crop varieties are worth 
pursuing, so that the outcomes projected by the model are ameliorated.  Of course other 
                                                 
4 El Nino Southern Oscillation – a measure of pressure difference between Tahiti and Darwin, and of the amount of 
warming or cooling of surface waters of the tropical eastern Pacific Ocean.     7 
actions such as changing cultivation practices and developing new cultivars might be 
cheaper.  
 
Cline (2007) uses six climate models to analyse the effect of climate change on 
agricultural production by two different methods: 
Cline  
•  Reduced-form, process-based crop models that include adaptation 
responses such as fertilizer, irrigation, crop varieties, planting dates, and so on. 
•  Riccardian, regional cross-section models based on econometric 
analysis of the effects of temperature and precipitation on output. Implicitly these 
models include some types of adaptation responses, but cannot by definition, 
allow for the effects of carbon fertilization. 
The focus of the analysis is on the 2080s, with the GCM results relating to SRES 
Scenario A2.  Global warming by the 2080s is 3°C.  Both types of models are applied 
country by country or at an even finer level.
5
The results from the various models are weighted up according to author’s 
assessment of their reliability, leading to a ‘preferred estimate’ of a 16% reduction in 
world agricultural output in 2080 without any carbon fertilization effect and a reduction 
of 3% with carbon fertilization – relative to a scenario without climate change.  
Interestingly, for New Zealand the estimates are for increases of 2.2% and 17.5% 
respectively. (It may be worthwhile obtaining some other opinions on the reasonableness 
of these numbers.)  Cline notes that variability across the agricultural-economic models is 
more important than variability across the climate models.   
 
It is unfortunate that the useful metric of Days of Soil Moisture Deficit used in 
Ecoclimate (2007) for measuring the direct impact of climate change, is not used in the 
studies cited above.  This would have made it possible to reconcile these studies with the 
earlier work.   
 
                                                 
5 Some of the models were also those used in Parry et al (2004), whose research contributed to the modelling in 
Infometrics (2007).      8 
While the focus on 2080 is welcome, essentially all we have is some information 
about the shift in the supply curve.  Prices are completely absent and there is no allowance 
for international trade.  This seemingly makes the information of little value to our 
intended GE modelling.   
Estimate price changes 
In Table 2 (from Msangi and Rosegrant) the average price change is about -26% 
for a 6% increase in quantity, implying a demand elasticity of 0.23.  As noted, Cline’s 
estimates of changes in production relate to shifts of the supply curve, not to a change in 
the quantity consumed. However, from standard theoretical results on the incidence of a 
















where ∂Q/Q is the horizontal shift of the supply curve, not the change in the 
quantity at equilibrium.  
Intuitively, if the supply curve is vertical (ηS=0), the effect on price is determined 
only by the elasticity of demand.  If the supply curve is horizontal (ηS=∞), price does not 
change. 
Using the estimate ηD = -0.23 and assuming this holds in 2080, Table 3 shows the implied 
change in the market price for a range of plausible values of ηS.   
Martin (1991) in a survey of many studies estimates a long run price elasticity of supply 
of 0.3 to 0.9; covering a range of 0.6 to 0.9 in relatively advanced and land-abundant 
countries and 0.2-0.5 in developing countries.  In the long run supply responses depend 
more on technologies than on opportunities for land use change.
6
Table 3: Changes in Global Food Prices in 2080 
 
 
Supply curve shift      ηS  0.30  0.50  0.70  0.90 
∂Q/Q=-3%, C fert.  5.7%  4.1%  3.2%  2.7% 
∂Q/Q=-16%, no C fert  30.2%  21.9%  17.2%  14.2% 
                                                 
6 There is much uncertainty in estimates of the price elasticity of supply for agriculture.  A good discussion is 
given in Diebold and Lamb (1996).     9 
Without carbon fertilization the price changes are significant.  Note that these 
price changes are after any movement along the supply curve.  For example, for ηS=0.5 
and a shift in the supply curve of -16%, the change in the actual quantity supplied to the 
market is only -5.0%. 
As a further illustration of the effects of uncertainty, Tebaldi and Lobell (2008) 
present a probabilistic assessment of the effects of climate change on crop yields using 
regression models.  Excluding adaptation responses (and price effects), they estimate 
ranges of yield uncertainty for barley, maize and wheat, as shown in Figures 1-3.  With 
climate and crop uncertainty combined, the interquartile range spans about ten percentage 
points, but the estimates are firmly negative.  Adding the carbon fertilization effect still 
gives a strong negative result for maize, but a weak negative result for barley and a weak 
positive result for wheat.  
The maize result is at odds with that obtained by Msangi and Rosegrant, shown in 
Table 2 above.  The difference is more than can be attributed to the difference in time 
horizons.  However, Tebaldi and Lobell point out that their ranges are intended more to 
quantify the degree of uncertainty around any given point estimates, rather than 
portraying the actual uncertainty around whatever might be the best point estimates. This 
would also need to include other sources of uncertainty such as around the choice of 
model and  data quality. 
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Figure 2: Changes in Maize Yield to 2030 
 
Figure 3: Changes in Wheat Yield to 2030 
 
Source: Tebaldi and Lobell (2008) 
From the implied price changes in Table 3 it seems that a reduction in global food 
prices of around 5% under carbon fertilization is plausible.  According to Cline new 
Zealand’s agricultural output would increase by 17.5%, but for modelling purposes (in the 
following section) we scale this back to 15%. 
Summary 
Without carbon fertilization the price changes in Table 3 cover a large range, from 
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4. General Equilibrium Modelling 
Infometrics (2009) looks at alternative emissions scenarios for New Zealand in 
2070.  So as to preserve the opportunity to integrate that research with our current focus 
on the effects of climate change on New Zealand via its effect on global food prices, we 
use the same 2070/71 Business as Usual (BAU) scenario as a reference case against which 
to compare different food price scenarios.  
Scenario specification 
The BAU is not intended as a forecast of the economy.  Rather it is intended as a 
plausible projection of the economy in the absence of major external events and major 
policy changes, although a carbon price is included.  Details of its construction are given 
in Appendix A. 
To the BAU the following ‘shocks’ are applied to simulate the indirect effects of 
climate change on the demand for New Zealand’s agricultural exports.  These draw on the 
results discussed in Section 3. 
 
•  Scenario 1: A price increase of 5% for exports and imports of dairy, meat and 
horticultural products, coupled with an improvement in agricultural productivity of 
15% to simulate the effects of carbon fertilization. 
 
•  Scenario 2: A price increase of 15% for exports and imports of dairy, meat and 
horticultural products, with no change in productivity. 
 
•  Scenario 3: A price increase of 30% for exports and imports of dairy, meat and 
horticultural products, with no change in productivity.  Scenario 3a is a sensitivity 
test with all price elasticities of demand for New Zealand exports arbitrarily halved. 
 
•  Scenario 4: As in Scenario 3 but in the context of New Zealand being part of an 
international agreement to reduce emissions.  Higher agricultural prices can be 
expected to increase New Zealand’s GHG emissions, implying the need for either 
more domestic abatement or the purchase of emissions permits on the 
international market at the prevailing carbon price.  
     12 
            Scenarios 1-3 and the BAU, while including a carbon price, do not contain any 
assumption about an international emissions obligation in 2070. Thus if emissions rise New 
Zealand is not forced to purchase more emission permits on the world market.  In 
Scenario 4, any rise in emissions must be offset by the purchase of permits.  
             In these scenarios the following are held constant at BAU levels: 
•  Total employment, wage rates endogenous. 
•  Total capital stock, user costs of capital endogenous. 
•  Balance of payments as in world prices, real exchange rate endogenous. 
•  Fiscal surplus, personal income tax rates endogenous. 
The first two macroeconomic closure rules imply that the overall level of resource 
use in the economy is not dependent on climate change.  Other closure rules are possible.  
For example instead of fixed employment, wage rates could be fixed at BAU levels.  This 
implies, however, that the long run level of total employment is driven more by the 
climate than by the forces of labour supply and demand, which we consider unlikely.  The 
climate is more likely to affect people’s incomes.  
The third rule ensures that the cost of any adverse external shock such as lower 
demand for New Zealand exports is not met simply by borrowing more offshore, as this is 
not sustainable.  Relaxing this constraint would mean that in the long term New Zealand 
could run a larger external deficit than it otherwise would – not a view likely to be shared 
by foreign lenders and investors.   
The fourth rule prevents the results from being confounded by issues around the 
optimal size of government.   
 
Table 4 shows the results, excluding those for Scenario 3a which are shown in 
Table 5.  The changes refer to the levels of the variables in the various scenarios relative to 
the levels in the BAU.  While the changes ostensibly relate to 2070, they apply to any year 
that the scenarios are valid.  For example if the 15% price shift in Scenario 2 was also to 
prevail in 2050 or 2080, then the effect on RGNDI will be about 1% in those years too, 
albeit that the absolute dollar amounts would probably be different.  
Model results     13 
 
Table 4: Effects of Climate Change in 2070 
 
  BAU  Scen 1  Scen 2  Scen 3  Scen 4 
Macroeconomy  % pa on ‘05 
Private Consumption 
% change on BAU 
2.4  0.8  1.2  2.7  2.2 
Exports  2.5  1.2  -0.2  -0.2  0.6 
Imports  3.0  1.4  2.5  5.5  5.0 
GDP  2.0  0.4  -0.2  -0.4  -0.2 
RGNDI  2.4  0.6  1.0  2.3  1.9 
RGNDI/capita  1.9         
           
CO2e emissions (Mt)  1.5  5.0  6.4  12.5  12.8 
 of which CH4 & N2O  1.9  7.2  9.3  18.2  18.6 
(BAU CO2e = 193 Mt)           
 
Comparing Scenarios 1 and 2; both show a favourable effect on RGNDI, but the 
latter is considerably greater.  Thus a 15% increase in the prices of unprocessed foods has 
a better effect on New Zealand’s aggregate economic welfare than a 5% increase in prices 
coupled with 15% higher agricultural productivity. 
Any increase in productivity will raise the volume of production (GDP) for given 
inputs, but by enhancing the competitiveness of exports it also means that exporters move 
down the demand curve 
Export demand curves are downward sloping, not horizontal, so New Zealand 
exports can rise or fall as our price is below or above the world price. (At a very fine level 
of commodity disaggregation the demand curve facing New Zealand may well be 
horizontal, but the model’s commodity definitions are not that homogeneous.  For 
example ‘dairy products’ includes everything from milk powder to lactoferrins and 
gourmet cheeses.)  
Hence there is a positive and negative effect on RGNDI – higher GDP but lower 
terms of trade.  In contrast, higher world agricultural prices have the same effect as an 
outward movement of the demand curve for New Zealand exports, enabling an increase 
in average export prices and thus an increase in the terms of trade.  The value of exports 
of unprocessed products exceeds the value of imports of unprocessed products by a 
factor of about seven.       14 
There is a small offsetting negative effect on GDP as resources get pulled into 
agriculture in the presence of diminishing returns to land – clearly demonstrating the 
inadequacy of GDP as a measure of economic welfare.  
We infer therefore that New Zealand would be better off if there is no carbon 
fertilization effect from climate change.  Essentially this is because while we benefit from 
carbon fertilization, so do other countries.  Such a result was also noted by Darwin (2004) 
and discussed in Infometrics (2007).  Furthermore, if the carbon fertilization effect is so 
strong that agricultural commodity prices fall, New Zealand’s economic welfare could 
actually decline.   
In terms of a framework presented in Stern (2006, 94) - shown below – even 
though New Zealand’s Adaptive Capacity in agriculture is high, a larger agricultural sector 
driven by higher productivity from carbon fertilization raises Sensitivity to climate change, 
so the net effect could be an increase in overall Vulnerability. 
Figure 4: Vulnerability to Climate Change 
 
The powerful effect of higher agricultural commodity prices (no carbon 
fertilization) is reinforced in Scenario 3.  Based on a low world agricultural price elasticity 
of supply, a relative world price rise of 30% leads to an increase in RGNDI of 2.3% and 
in private consumption of 2.7% relative to BAU.  The former corresponds to an increase 
of about $2700 per person (in 2005/06 prices). 
Greenhouse gas emissions, however, rise by 12.5%, driven largely by an 18% rise 
in emissions of methane and nitrous oxide as agricultural output expands in response to 
the higher world prices.  As noted above, there is no obligation on New Zealand to take 
responsibility for emissions in excess of some agreed amount – as long as the carbon tax 
is paid on all emissions.  
By 2070 there may or may not be an international agreement to limit GHG 
emissions.  Assuming that such an agreement exists and that New Zealand is party to it, 
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emission permits on the international market at US$100/tonne (the carbon price in the 
BAU – refer Appendix A),
7
The higher value of payments to foreigners lowers the increase in RGNDI from 
2.3% to 1.9%.  Resources are diverted out of private consumption and into exports in 
order to obtain the foreign exchange needed to buy the emission permits.  
 implying higher net factor payments to foreigners.  This is 
simulated in Scenario 4. 
Thus even though a carbon price of US$100/tonne in the context of an emissions 
cap reduces the benefit to New Zealand under a climate scenario that leads to a 30% 
increase in world agricultural commodity prices, the benefit (RGNDI) is still positive. 
Of course this raises an interesting question; if carbon fertilization occurs and all 
countries increase agricultural output, would the price of carbon rise?  New Zealand 
agriculture is relatively GHG intensive because of emissions of CH4 and N2O, and the 
coefficients currently used to convert those emissions into CO2 equivalent units.  In some 
other countries, however, agriculture is more directly CO2 intensive, so a world agriculture 
and trade model would be needed to determine the effect of carbon fertilization on the 
price of carbon, for a given stabilisation scenario.   
 
As we have seen above, any increase in world agricultural commodity prices 
improves the competitiveness of New Zealand agricultural exporters.  Does the impact on 
New Zealand change if foreign consumers are less sensitive to the cheaper New Zealand 
price?  This is explored in Scenario 3a, where the price elasticity of demand for all exports 
(including non-agricultural goods and services) is arbitrarily halved.  Table 5 shows the 
results along with those for Scenario 3. 
Sensitivity test 
With a potential decline in demand for New Zealand exports relative to Scenario 
3, as world consumers are now less inclined to switch to cheaper New Zealand products, 
the real exchange rate needs to fall in order to prevent the balance of payments from 
deteriorating.  The volume of exports rises in response, but a larger part of the required 
adjustment occurs on the import side.  Imports rise by 4.7% in Scenario 3a compared to 
5.5% in Scenario 3.  
                                                 
7 Note that the US$100/tonne carbon price is intended to be a plausible projection of a worlds carbon 
price in 2070/71, but is essentially arbitrary.      16 
With lower terms of trade, private consumption and RGNDI both increase by less 
than in Scenario 3, but still well above BAU levels, so there is still a strong gain to New 
Zealand if global warming is not accompanied by significant carbon fertilization. 
Table 5: Effects of Climate Change in 2070 
 
  Scen 3  Scen 3a 
Macroeconomy 
Private Consumption 
% change on BAU 
2.7  2.2 
Exports  -0.2  0.1 
Imports  5.5  4.7 
GDP  -0.4  -0.3 
RGNDI  2.3  1.9 
 Real exchange rate  8.4  5.4 
 Terms of Trade  5.4  4.3 
     
CO2e emissions (Mt)  12.5  7.5 
 of which CH4 & N2O  18.2  10.7 
 
The increase in GHG emissions in Scenario 3a is markedly lower than in Scenario 
3 – about 14 Mt versus 24 Mt.  From Table 4, Scenarios 3 & 4, the effect of having to 
account for another 24 Mt of GHG emissions by purchasing international emission 
permits lowers the change in RGNDI from 2.3% to 1.9%.  So, having to account for 
another 14Mt would lower the change in RGNDI observed in Scenario 3a from 1.9% to 
about 1.7%.   
Overall then, while overstated export price elasticities of demand would overstate 
the effect on national welfare of the effects of climate change on global food prices 
without carbon fertilization, such overstatement is small and is reduced further if New 
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5. Results in Perspective 
EcoClimate (2007) looked at the direct effects of climate change on New Zealand 
agriculture.  It summarised the findings of other research based on econometric analysis, 
provisionally concluding that a change of one standard deviation in the number of days 
of soil moisture deficit (DSMD, a commonly used metric for measuring climate change 
effects on agriculture), reduces agricultural gross output by less than 5% in most cases.  
The flow-on effect on New Zealand’s GDP of such a change is around 0.1%.  However, 
the effects are not linear.  A change of three standard deviations in DSMD reduces 
national GDP by around 1%.   
Direct and Indirect Effects 
These estimates do not include economic loss from short term catastrophic events 
such floods and landslides. 
As noted previously using GDP as a welfare measure is not ideal. Still, when 
dealing with the direct impact of climate change on domestic agricultural output one not 
would expect any significant changes in New Zealand’s international payment obligations, 
and only small changes in the terms of trade.  Hence we can probably interpret the effect 
on GDP as being very similar to the effect on RGNDI.  
A change of three standard deviations in DSMD on a national scale is severe.  We 
are not aware of projections of climate change over the next 50 years or so having this 
degree of permanent impact.  Thus a 1% pure impact on RGDP/RGNDI from the effect 
of climate change on agricultural production is probably at the high end, for the given 
horizon.  Also, as noted by Cline (op cit) cross-section econometric modelling cannot pick 
up carbon fertilisation which raises output.  (Time series econometric modelling could in 
principle capture the carbon fertilization effect, but it has presumably been too small to 
capture in such analysis to date.  Further, while time series modelling is good at estimating 
the effects on output from deviations in DSMD relative to what is currently considered 
normal in climate terms, long run responses to a slow change in the climate could be quite 
different.)   
Accordingly our assessment based on research to date is that the direct impact of 
climate change on New Zealand’s RGDP/RGNDI via its effect on agricultural output, 
could be a small negative number – probably not more negative than about 0.5%.  In view 
of Cline’s results, however, a positive effect of similar magnitude is also plausible.     18 
In contrast Table 4 shows that RGNDI could rise by over 2% as a consequence of 
higher world agricultural commodity prices if there is no carbon fertilization effect, easily 
outweighing the direct effects of climate change on agriculture.  Again this ignores 
changes in the frequency of extreme events. 
All scenarios examined above are assessed against a BAU that has no climate 
change, but does have some climate change mitigation policy in the form of a carbon 
price.  The BAU is therefore useful for understanding the various ways by which climate 
change could affect the economy, but is somewhat misleading as it is an artifice – climate 
change is certain. 
Hence, given that climate change will occur, it seems sensible to investigate how 
New Zealand’s comparative advantage in agriculture can be preserved if carbon 
fertilization delivers a significant fillip to world agricultural production – adaptive capacity 
in the framework of Figure 4 above.  The greater the positive direct effect of global 
warming on New Zealand’s agricultural output, the less valuable that output will be in 
terms of enhancing our economic welfare.  The net effect could even be negative. 
 
None of the above research represents the final word on the effects of climate 
change on agriculture and thereby on the national economy.  Future research could 
overturn current findings and there are other industries such as energy, tourism and 
fishing that will also be affected by climate change – whether positively or negatively.  
Future Research 
With regard to agriculture an expanded literature review may help to reduce 
uncertainty, but we think it unlikely that we have missed anything of significant relevance 
to New Zealand.  Instead we believe that the priority for future research should be joint 
modelling that uses the results of world-wide modelling of the production and trade of 
agricultural commodities (those relevant to New Zealand) as input into the ESSAM 
general equilibrium model.  The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) modelling project 
is a candidate in this regard as there are experts in New Zealand who could undertake 
such work, though the GTAP model in turn may require inputs derived from Integrated     19 
Assessment Models.  Hopefully any such joint modelling could also capture the effect of 
carbon fertilization on the price of carbon.
8
Another large gap relating to agriculture is an assessment of the effects on New 
Zealand of more of the world’s biomass production being used for producing energy, 
especially liquid fuels, rather than for food.  We recommend this area as another priority 
for future research.  
  
Finally, research to date has largely ignored the economic impacts of changes in 
the frequency and/or extent of extreme events under a warmer climate. Thus this is an 















                                                 
8 Infometrics and Motu are currently discussing GTAP options with Massey and Waikato Universities.  
The Lincoln (University) Trade and Environment Model could also be useful in this regard.     20 
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7. Appendix A: BAU Scenario Input Assumptions 
 
The projection period is to 2070/71, implying 65 years from model’s 2005/06 base year.  
The main input assumptions for the model are discussed below. 
 
Official projections by SNZ reach as far as 2060/61.  Hence we have extrapolated the 
annual growth rate over 2055/56 to 2060/61 for another ten years.  This yields a 
population projection of 5,652,000.  In 2005/06, which is the base year for SNZ’s 
projections, the population was 4,185,000, implying an average growth rate of 0.46% per 
annum. 
Population 
The Series 5 projection (shown in the graph below) assumes a middle path with respect to 
fertility, mortality and migration; namely medium fertility, medium mortality and net 
immigration of an average 10,000 people per annum.  Changing the migration assumption 
to 5000 or 15,000 per annum changes the projected population to 5,174,000 or 6,129,000 
respectively.  The effects of changing from medium fertility to low or high fertility are 
similar.  Changing the mortality assumption has smaller effects.  
 
Source: SNZ 
A projection of the labour force is obtained in the same manner, again based on Series 5, 
with medium (as opposed to low or high) labour force participation rates. 
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The projected figure for 2070/71 is 2,808,000, with the low and high participation rate 
assumptions yielding 2,694,000 and 2,922,000 respectively; about ±4%.  The labour force 
in 2005/06 was 2,240,000, implying average growth of 0.35% pa. 
For such a long term projection the model requires either total employment or the average 
wage rate to be set exogenously.  Our preferred approach is make an assumption about the 
rate of unemployment and let the model produce whatever profile of wage rates is 
consistent with this, rather than the other way around.   
In a modern economy the rate of unemployment in the long run is driven primarily by 
demographic factors and labour market regulations, whereas  wage rates are ultimately a 
function of the growth of the economy.  Thus it is more plausible to assume some rate of 
unemployment that society is prepared to tolerate, which is likely to cover a fairly narrow 
range, than to assume some set growth path for wages – which could easily produce 
totally unrealistic projections of unemployment. 
 
 
We assume an unemployment rate of 3.5%; on the low side of historical rates, but 
recognising the projected aging of the population and the associated slow growth in 
labour force. 
 
The model requires projections of rates of improvement in energy efficiency –  often 
referred to in energy models as the AEEI; the autonomous energy efficient improvement 
parameter.  This is fuel specific and hence is required for coal, natural gas, oil products 
and electricity. 
Energy and Energy Efficiency     24 
 Typically in our modelling we have used 1% pa for all fuels except for electricity use by 
households where a lower rate of 0.5% pa has been used.  This is not because the 
efficiency of household appliances is assumed to improve at a slower rate than industrial 
machinery.  Rather it is a crude way to capture the increasing use of electrical appliances 
(such as computers and television decoders) that were previously less prevalent and that 
are frequently left on, even if only in stand-by mode, for extended periods of time.  To 
this one might add the increasing use of clothes driers associated with the move to 
apartment living, and heat pumps which, while very efficient, are often used for air 
conditioning in homes which had no air conditioning prior to installation of a heat pump. 
 
In MED (2006) the AEEI is about 0.5-1.0% pa.  We assume 1.0% pa for industrial and 
commercial use of all fuels.  Assumptions for road transport and household energy are as 
follows. 
Household electricity use 
We assume an underlying AEEI of 0.5% pa as a crude balance between the increasing 
technical efficiency of household appliances, the use of in-home solar power and the 
offsetting effect of more appliances.  However, Beacon Pathway (2007) looked in detail at 
some key opportunities for improvements in household energy efficiency, notably in space 
heating (retrofit insulation and more efficient heating mechanisms such as heat pumps), 
water heating and lighting.  By 2025 expected cost-effective household energy savings 
amount to over 30%.  Not all houses are amenable to cost-effective retrofitting insulation.  
Nor do we expect 100% penetration of compact fluorescent lighting (barring legislation) 
or efficient heating appliances.  Nevertheless, by 2071 the efficiency gains could easily 
reach 50%, thereby raising the AEEI for household electricity to almost 1.6% pa in total.   
Private road transport 
Private road transport is a particularly difficult area, with improvements in vehicle fuel 
efficiency and diesel-petrol substitution being offset by a trend to larger petrol vehicles 
and diesel SUVs (at least up to the recent sharp increases in oil prices).  Further offset 
comes from the increasing weight of cars caused by more stringent safety standards.  
Based on MED (2006) estimates which take into account real income growth, greater 
diesel use, better technical energy efficiency and a changing fleet mix, the implicit 
efficiency gain is about 1.2% pa up to 2030.       25 
For commercial vehicle use we assume a lower figure of 1% pa (up to 2070/71), as the 
relative shift to diesel vehicles is much smaller.  To maintain the MED average this implies 
a rate for vehicle use by private households of 1.6% pa up to 2051 (to capture the shift to 
diesel), followed by 1% pa thereafter. 
Another issue around energy is the large scale ‘step changes’ that could occur with a shift 
to plug-in electric or hybrid vehicles, or the widespread use of biofuels in transport.  
These possibilities are not explored here by see Scion (2009) with regard to the latter. 
Electricity generation 
Left to itself the model will configure a generation mix that is similar to the 2005/06 mix, 
subject to changes in relative prices such as may be caused by a carbon price.  Clearly this 
is unsatisfactory – the gas supply may much lower than anticipated or there maybe 
significant technological advances in generation from tidal or wave power, or from waste.   
The assumed profile below is based on the MED (2006) ‘renewables’ scenario to 2030.   
Coal-fired generation has disappeared on the assumption that carbon capture and storage 
is not competitive with wind and tidal power.  
Solar-generated electricity on a large scale is assumed to be insignificant in New Zealand, 
although this is not to discount its potential.  Direct use of solar (photovoltaic) power by 
households is captured with the household energy efficiency parameter – see above.  
Electricity Supply by Fuel (%) 
  2005/06  2030  2070/71   
Hydro          58  58    } 
Wind            1  17  87  }  
Tidal/wave     6    } renewables 
Geothermal  7  9    } 
Cogen  5  5    } 
Gas  17  5  11  includes gas cogen 
Coal  12  0  2  >0 for dry years 
         
  145 PJ  174 PJ  21      
 
Forecasting the international price of carbon in 2070/71 is impossible.  Critical factors are 
which countries participate in international agreements to lower emissions, the tightness 
of international obligations, and the path of emissions over the intervening four decades.  
We take the view that by 2070/71 a carbon charge will have had a strong enough impact 
on GHG emissions such that the price of carbon will have declined from a peak during 
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the 2030s.  We assume a price of US$100/tonne CO2e. This might be seen as an 
optimistic scenario, but could equally reflect a lack of international political will to accept 
a high carbon price.   
 
The oil price is almost as difficult to forecast as the price of carbon.  We defer to the 
comprehensive discussion and analysis in NZTA (2008) which shows a number of 
projections for the price of oil in 2028 ranging between US65/bbl and US$230/bbl, with 
an average of about US$115/bbl (all in 2008 prices).  Most of the projections estimate a 
higher price before 2028.   
Oil Price 
We assume an average increase in price of 2.5% pa from 2028 to 2050, which is roughly 
its rate of real price increase over the last fifty years – albeit with much volatility.  This 
gives a price in 2050 of about US$200/bbl, a price which is retained for 2070/71.   
   
The model does not simulate price levels – it deals entirely in relative prices.  The price 
numéraire is the average import price, excluding oil.  With a fixed balance of payments 
constraint, the change in the real exchange rate – inflation in New Zealand relative to 
world inflation, multiplied by the change in the nominal exchange rate – is endogenous to 
the model.   Any given value of the change in the real exchange rate is consistent with 
many different combinations of relative inflation rates and changes in the nominal 
exchange rate.  For example, New Zealand inflation at 2% pa, world inflation at 3% pa 
and an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate of 1% pa, would leave the real exchange 
rate unchanged.  Doubling all of these amounts would yield the same outcome, as would 
New Zealand inflation of 2% pa, world inflation of 1% pa and a devaluation of the 
nominal exchange rate of 1% pa.  
Exchange Rate and Balance of Payments 
We can express the change in the price of oil (or of any international commodity) relative 
to the change in world prices in general but, given a model-endogenous value for the 
change in the real exchange rate, the change in the real price of oil in New Zealand dollars 
is independent of the nominal exchange rate.      27 
To illustrate, let us assume a change in the international oil price from US$70/bbl in 
2005/06 (the model’s base year) to $200 in 2050/51.  Without loss of generality, we 
further assume zero inflation in other world prices.   
If the model produces a change in the real exchange rate of plus 10%, then either New 
Zealand inflation is 10% over the period with no change in the nominal exchange rate, or 
New Zealand inflation is zero and the exchange rate appreciates by 10%, or some linear 
combination of these two scenarios prevails.   
It might appear that this means that the price of oil in New Zealand currency could be 
anywhere between NZ$200/bbl and NZ$180/bbl.  This is indeed the case, but the point 
is that the difference is irrelevant.  If the former price prevails it means that the real
What matters in the model is the real or relative price of oil, not its nominal price.  This is 
no different than saying that if all prices in the economy doubled, there would be no 
 price 
of oil in 2005/06 prices is NZ$180/bbl – because of New Zealand’s 10% general 
inflation.  This is exactly the real price that occurs if New Zealand has no inflation, but 
the nominal exchange rate appreciates by 10%.   
real
Returning then to the issue of the balance of payments, we presume that New Zealand’s 
long record of balance payments deficits cannot continue.  With other countries 
improving their economic management and providing profitable opportunities for 
investment, New Zealand will find it more difficult to attract foreign investment to cover a 
persistent balance of payments deficit.  Hence we assume a small balance of payments 
surplus of 1% on GDP in 2070/71.  With positive net factor payments (servicing of past 
debt) this will likely imply a larger surplus on the balance of trade in goods and services.  
 
effects.  In economics this is known as the principle of no money illusion.  It is fundamental 
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8. Appendix B: The ESSAM Model 
The ESSAM (Energy Substitution, Social Accounting Matrix) model is a general 
equilibrium model of the New Zealand economy.  It takes into account all of the main 
inter-dependencies in the economy, such as flows of goods from one industry to another, 
plus the passing on of higher wage costs in one industry into prices and thence the costs 
of other industries.  
The ESSAM model has previously been used to analyse the economy-wide and industry 
specific effects of a wide range of issues.  For example: 
•  Energy pricing scenarios 
•  Changes in import tariffs 
•  Faster technological progress  
•  Policies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
•  Funding regimes for roading  
•  Release of genetically modified organisms  
Some of the model’s features are: 
•  53 industry groups, as detailed in the table below.  
•  Substitution between inputs into production -  labour, capital, materials, 
energy.  
•  for energy types: coal, oil, gas and electricity, between which substitution is 
also allowed.  
•  Substitution between goods and services used by households. 
•  Social accounting matrix (SAM) for complete tracking of financial flows 
between households, government, business and the rest of the world.  
The model’s output is extremely comprehensive, covering the standard collection of 
macroeconomic and industry variables: 
•  GDP, private consumption, exports and imports, employment, etc. 
•  Demand for goods and services by industry, government, households and 
the rest of the world. 
•  Industry data on output, employment, exports etc.     29 
•  Import-domestic shares. 
•  Fiscal effects. 
 
These equations determine how much output can be produced with given amounts inputs.  
A two-level standard translog specification is used which distinguishes four factors of 
production – capital, labour, and materials and energy, with energy split into coal, oil, 
natural gas and electricity. 
Production Functions  
 
A composite commodity is defined which is made up of imperfectly substitutable 
domestic and imported components - where relevant.  The share of each of these 
components is determined by the elasticity of substitution between them and by relative 
prices.  
Intermediate Demand  
 
The price of industry output is determined by the cost of factor inputs (labour and 
capital), domestic and imported intermediate inputs, and tax payments (including tariffs).  
World prices are not affected by New Zealand purchases or sales abroad. 
Price Determination  
 
This is divided into Government Consumption and Private Consumption.  For the latter 
eight household commodity categories are identified, and spending on these is modelled 
using price and income elasticities in an AIDS framework.  An industry by commodity 
conversion matrix translates the demand for commodities into industry output 
requirements and also allows import-domestic substitution.  
Consumption Expenditure  
Government Consumption is usually either a fixed proportion of GDP or is set 
exogenously.  Where the budget balance is exogenous, either tax rates or transfer payments 
are assumed to be endogenous. 
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Owing to a lack of information on stock change, this is exogenously set as a proportion 
of GDP, domestic absorption or some similar macroeconomic aggregate.  The industry 
composition of stock change is set at the base year mix, although variation is permitted in 
the import-domestic composition.  
Stocks  
Industry investment is related to the rate of capital accumulation over the model’s 
projection period as revealed by demand for capital in the horizon year.  Allowance is 
made for depreciation.  Rental rates or the service price of capital (analogous to wage 
rates for labour) also affect capital formation.  Investment by industry of demand is 
converted into investment by industry of supply using a capital input- output table.  
Again, import-domestic substitution is possible between sources of supply. 
Investment  
 
These are determined from overseas export demand functions in relation to world prices 
and domestic prices inclusive of possible export subsidies, adjusted by the exchange rate.  
It is also possible to set export quantities exogenously. 
Exports  
 
Supply-demand balances are required to clear all product markets. Domestic output must 
equate to the demand stemming from consumption, investment, stocks, exports and 
intermediate requirements.  
Supply-Demand Identities  
 
Receipts from exports plus net capital inflows (or borrowing) must be equal to payments 
for imports; each item being measured in domestic currency net of subsidies or tariffs. 
Balance of Payments  
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In cases where total employment of a factor is exogenous, factor price relativities (for 
wages and rental rates) are usually fixed so that all factor prices adjust equi-proportionally 
to achieve the set target.  
Factor Market Balance  
Total expenditure on domestically consumed final demand must be equal to the income 
generated by labour, capital, taxation, tariffs, and net capital inflows.  Similarly, income and 
expenditure flows must balance between the five sectors identified in the model – 
business, household, government, foreign and capital.  
Income-Expenditure Identity  
 
The 53 industries identified in the ESSAM model are defined below. Industries definitions 
are according to Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification 
(ANZSIC). 
Industry Classification  
    
 
       27 
 
1  HFRG  Horticulture and fruit growing 
2  SBLC  Livestock and cropping farming 
3  DAIF  Dairy and cattle farming 
4  OTHF  Other farming 
5  SAHF  Services to agriculture, hunting and trapping 
6  FOLO  Forestry and logging 
7  FISH  Fishing 
8  COAL  Coal mining 
9  OIGA  Oil and gas extraction, production & distribution 
10  OMIN  Other Mining and quarrying 
11  MEAT  Meat manufacturing 
12  DAIR  Dairy manufacturing 
13  OFOD  Other food manufacturing 
14  BEVT  Beverage, malt and tobacco manufacturing 
15  TCFL  Textiles and apparel manufacturing 
16  WOOD  Wood product manufacturing 
17  PAPR  Paper and paper product manufacturing 
18  PPRM  Printing, publishing and recorded media 
19  PETR  Petroleum refining, product manufacturing 
20  CHEM  Fertiliser and other industrial chemical manufacturing 
21  RBPL  Rubber, plastic and other chemical product manufacturing 
22  NMMP  Non-metallic mineral product manufacturing 
23  BASM  Basic metal manufacturing 
24  FABM  Structural, sheet and fabricated metal product manufacturing 
25  MAEQ  Machinery and other equipment manufacturing 
26  OMFG  Furniture and other manufacturing 
27  EGEN  Electricity generation 
28  EDIS  Electricity transmission and distribution 
29  WATS  Water supply 
30  WAST  Sewerage, drainage and waste disposal services 
31  CONS  Construction 
32  TRDE  Wholesale and retail trade 
33  ACCR  Accommodation, restaurants and bars 
34  RDFR  Road freight transport 
35  RDPS  Road passenger transport 
36  RAIL  Rail transport 
37  WATR  Water transport 
38  AIRS  Air transport and transport services 
39  COMM  Communication services 
40  FIIN  Finance and insurance 
41  REES  Real estate 
42  EHOP  Equipment hire and investors in other property 
43  OWND  Ownership of owner-occupied dwellings 
44  SRCS  Scientific research and computer services 
45  OBUS  Other business services 
46  GOVC  Central government administration and defence 
47  GOVL  Local government administration 
48  SCHL  Pre-school, primary and secondary education 
49  OEDU  Other education 
50  HOSP  Hospitals and nursing homes 
51  OHCS  Other health and community services 
52  CULT  Cultural and recreational services 
53  PERS  Personal and other community services Recent Motu Working Papers 
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